Hutchison Port Holdings Trust

[Ray168]

Does any VB know why this stock has become so unloved today?

The drop in price to this level is unprecedented and quite sudden.

Any news on latest happening out there to share? Thanks so much.

Full year result will be publish on Feb 5, 2018. 

My guess is that the result is disappointing and BB run road.

[specuvestor]

Heard they drop port prices

If you see the shipping thread we already mentioned container oligopoly is forming

[sykn]

Thanks for sharing your analysis of the probable cause.

What's puzzling to me is that both of China's exports and imports have been increasing, so prices aside, we should be seeing the volumes increasing at HPH ports, but this did not seem to be the case.

[karlmarx]

HPHT's main port assets are in Hong Kong and Shenzhen. China's busiest port is in Shanghai. There are also ports which compete with HPHT in Ningbo, Guangzhou and Qingdao. So while overall trade activities in China may be increasing, not all of the business may be going to HPHT.

http://www.scmp.com/lifestyle/article/20...would-mean

[cfa]

HPHT's main port assets are in Hong Kong and Shenzhen. China's busiest port is in Shanghai. There are also ports which compete with HPHT in Ningbo, Guangzhou and Qingdao. So while overall trade activities in China may be increasing, not all of the business may be going to HPHT.

http://www.scmp.com/lifestyle/article/20...would-mean

This explained why LKS did not want to offload its shanghai port but only Hk And SZ ports .

[sykn]

Oh, I went back to check on the last Quarter's performance. The restructuring into co-management arrangement makes it difficult to compare the figures with the previous Quarter of 3Q16. I was wrong, combine container throughput actually went up 12.8% because of improved trade with Europe and the US. However, average revenue per TEU went down, probably because of decline in prices. Overall, the total operating profit was only 0.5% below 3Q16. But the finance costs shot up a lot because of higher LIBOR/HIBOR applied to their loans, which are very large. Taxes also went up a lot because of the end of tax exemption period, but then some new and lower rates kicked in. So overall, I think the picture is mixed - while excess port capacity and global increase in interest rates portend ill for HPHT, the huge CAPEX put into improve mega-vessels handling in Yiantian will pay dividends. So jury is still out whether HPH is definitely experiencing a secular decline in its business. Let's see the results that will come out next Monday night.

[corydorus]

LKS is a shrewd businessman. That' show he makes money I believe. If he is willing to list, we need to fully understand the motivation behind.

HPHT's main port assets are in Hong Kong and Shenzhen. China's busiest port is in Shanghai. There are also ports which compete with HPHT in Ningbo, Guangzhou and Qingdao. So while overall trade activities in China may be increasing, not all of the business may be going to HPHT.

http://www.scmp.com/lifestyle/article/20...would-mean

This explained why LKS did not want to offload its shanghai port but only Hk And SZ ports .

 Not really a surprise. He is a shrewd businessman !  :-)

[karlmarx]

HPHT faces a potentially painful situation as it continues to make distribution to unitholders above its income, in a highly competitive Pearl River Delta region for port operations.


HKD (billion)                    FY11        FY12        FY13        FY14        FY15        FY16        Total
Distributions                    1,245       4,132        3,996      3,571       3,310       2,848       19,104

Comprehensive Income    1,795      2,198        1,995      1,871       1,593       1,497        10,398
Depreciation less Capex............................................................................................ 4,696
Increase of Bank Loans..............................................................................................4,430

Only half the distributions are financed by income. How much longer is this sustainable?

If HPHT's assets are performing, then I have no doubt that banks will be more willing to refinance its debts when the time comes. I may also be more assured of HPHT's ability to finance distributions just from its income. But operational data from its Kwai Tsing Terminal (Hong Kong) and Yantian International Container Terminal (Shenzhen), is not encouraging.

Hong Kong Container Outbound Transshipment
Year                02    03    04    05    06    07    08    09    10    11    12    13    14    15    16    17
Million TEUs     3.9   4.4   4.7   4.8   5.4   6.2   6.5   5.8   6.6   7.1   6.9    6.7   6.6   5.8   5.6   6.1

Yantian International Container Terminal Total Throughput
Year                02    03    04    05    06    07    08    09    10    11    12    13    14   15    16
Million TEUs     4.1   5.2   6.2   7.5   8.8   10    9.6   8.5   10.1  10.2 10.6  10.7 11.6 12.1 11.6

Hong Kong ports have struggled since peaking in transshipment throughput in 2007, while Yantian ports appear to have its growth stalled. The main competitor taking away business are the ports in Shekou and Chiwan in Shenzhen (which are now allowed to provide transshipment services to foreign vessels), and Shanghai, all operated by China Merchant Port Holdings.

Throughput in million TEU                 08     09     10     11     12     13     14    15     16
Shanghai                                        28.0   25.0  29.0  31.7  32.5  33.6  35.2  36.5  37.1
Hong Kong                                     24.4   21.0   23.5  24.3  23.1 22.3  22.2  20.0  21.5
Shenzhen                                       21.4  18.2   22.5  22.5  22.8  23.2  24.0  24.2  23.9

Shanghai is the clear winner. Hong Kong is declining, where HPHT owns a majority of the berths. In Shenzhen, the growth has stalled, and HPHT has to share the market with more competitive rivals.

If HPHT continues to distribute more than its income, and if the port competition situation in Hong Kong and Shenzhen does not improve -- and it does not appear likely to -- then this could be another RMT or FSL in the making. Meanwhile, management continues to pocket fees which trend opposite to the income for unitholders.

HKD (million)                                FY11    FY12    FY13     FY14     FY15    FY16
Key Management Compensation      12.1    23.1     25.9     30.4       30.9     31.2


I have not used FY17 figures, but I believe they are congruent with my arguments here.

[cfa]

Temasek was the cornerstone investors when it went IPO , just wonder how much paper loss is Temasek sitting now ?

[karlmarx]

PSA has a 10% stake, which is quite normal as they are constantly on the lookout to acquire port assets around the world.

At the time of IPO, it was probably not expected (by most) that China will allow some of its mainland ports to act as transshipment hubs, thereby threatening Hong Kong's monopoly.