Bloomberg: 'Ghost of 1994' looms over Asia

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#1
Note that there remains a time lag of 3 years before the penultimate bull run in equities came crashing down. Moreover with the experience of the past, human beings can safely assumed to be smarter in avoiding the repeat of previous mistakes - lightning never strike twice at the same location

'Ghost of 1994' looms over Asia

Bank of Korea chief fears a repeat of the Great Bond Market Massacre of 1994

Published on Jun 08, 2013

Bank of Korea governor Kim Chong Soo fears a repeat of the chaos if the Fed scraps the quantitative easing experiment or curtails its US$85 billion purchases of debt each month. -- PHOTO: BLOOMBERG



By William Pesek

MR KIM Choong Soo is seeing ghosts, and that should scare you.
No, the Bank of Korea governor is not seeing ghouls or hearing things that go bump in the night. The nightmare preoccupying him involves Mr Alan Greenspan and what traders call the Great Bond Market Massacre of 1994. Mr Kim worries that history is about to repeat itself, potentially devastating Asian growth rates.
Back in the 1990s, when he was United States Federal Reserve chairman, Mr Greenspan doubled benchmark lending rates over 12 months, causing, according to Fortune magazine, more than US$600 billion in losses on US Treasuries. The chaos drove Orange County, California, into bankruptcy; sank Kidder Peabody & Co; pushed Mexico into crisis; and precipitated Asia's 1997 meltdown as a surging dollar strained currency pegs.
Now, Mr Greenspan's successor, Mr Ben Bernanke, is under pressure to unwind the US central bank's unprecedented US$3.3 trillion (S$4.1 trillion) balance sheet. A growing number of staff members want to scrap the Fed's quantitative easing (QE) experiment or at least curtail its US$85 billion purchases of debt each month. Once the "tapering" process begins, debt yields from Seoul to Sao Paulo will probably jump in sudden and destabilising ways.
Fed officials insist they will tread carefully, but Mr Kim cannot help but fear that the "ghost of 1994" will again wreak havoc on bond markets.
And he is not alone. Bank of America Merrill Lynch strategist Michael Hartnett warns of a "repeat of the 1994 moment" and Goldman Sachs Group Inc chief executive officer Lloyd Blankfein admits: "I worry now (as) I look out of the corner of my eye to the 1994 period."
"We all experienced that and we all know what happened, and I hope not to experience that again," Mr Kim told The Wall Street Journal last week. He wants policymakers to "find a compromise solution so that all things will happen in an orderly fashion. If not, then we are likely to face another series of difficulties".
That could be a huge understatement in Asia, where last time around, Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand were forced to seek International Monetary Fund bailouts.
There are three big risks if Bernanke & Co withdraw liquidity: higher borrowing costs, huge swings in financial markets and lower economic growth. And that is if the Fed restores normalcy to monetary policy in an orderly, gradual and transparent way. If the process is handled clumsily, as it was in 1994, then next year could be a disastrous year for the world's most dynamic region.
"The markets that are particularly volatile are high-yield and emerging-market debt," said Mr Dan Fuss, who manages the US$23.3 billion Loomis Sayles Bond Fund in Boston and is a veteran of many bond-market crashes dating back to the 1960s. "The scenario isn't pretty."
The Fed may not move for some time. US unemployment is more than 7 per cent and the risks of deflation are at least as high as those of accelerating inflation. Also, Mr Bernanke's Fed is far more open and communicative than Mr Greenspan's Kremlin-like organisation. The odds favour Mr Bernanke telegraphing policy shifts well in advance.
Yet any missteps could quickly panic markets. Sovereign-debt levels have more than quadrupled to US$23 trillion since 1994.
Concerns about too much debt chasing too few buyers could amplify market swings. The world economy was a far healthier thing 19 years ago; before the euro existed, China's economy mattered and high-frequency trading dominated the world's bourses. Asia now holds trillions of dollars of currency reserves.
For all the problems that ultra-low rates cause, they also boosted gross domestic product. Asia must find ways to fill the void with looser fiscal and monetary policies of their own. The real worry, though, is full-blown financial contagion. South Korea is better positioned than many peers, thanks to a sizeable current-account surplus. The same goes for the Philippines, Taiwan and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. The region's fiscal weak links, notably Indonesia and India, would not fare as well.
South-east Asian economies that did not use the rapid growth of recent years to re-tool economies - think Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam - are vulnerable. Export-addicted China could be in for a rough ride.
Policymakers must act now and in concert to prepare for the worst.
Everyone knows that sooner or later, the Fed will have to yank away the proverbial punchbowl. Asia can hope for Mr Bernanke to act soberly and with caution. But the region had better be prepared for a scare, too.
BLOOMBERG
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#2
Suicides rate in Korea is highest in the world....not surprising to be pessimistic.
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#3
in 1994 Asia was crazily levereged , now it's a net creditor , I can't see how higher rates could hurt it.
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#4
Real estate is the "mother" of all financial crisis...rates go up.. real estate prices impacted.. and the usual story again... ..pray that there casualties are contained next round. Call me pessimist .. but I find no reason to be optimistic given the run up of property prices in recent years..
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#5
IIRC, the 1994 Mexico Tequila crisis and 1997 Asian crisis were due to foreign exchange. In 1997 Asian crisis, Thailand started due to its huge USD-denominated debts, and other neighboring Asia countries affected. I am not so sure on Peso crisis, I assume it is the same situation.

IMO, real estate is unlikely a "mother" of all financial crisis.
“夏则资皮,冬则资纱,旱则资船,水则资车” - 范蠡
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#6
(09-06-2013, 11:32 AM)CityFarmer Wrote: IMO, real estate is unlikely a "mother" of all financial crisis.

What about the 2008 US subprime mortgage crisis ?
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#7
(09-06-2013, 12:06 PM)rogerwilco Wrote:
(09-06-2013, 11:32 AM)CityFarmer Wrote: IMO, real estate is unlikely a "mother" of all financial crisis.

What about the 2008 US subprime mortgage crisis ?

First of all, for argument sake, 2008 crisis is just one crisis among the three discussed, so it is non-conclusive to say "mother of all". Big Grin

Secondly, I will not relate the 2008 crisis with real estate, but with financial engineering and incentive model of bankers.
“夏则资皮,冬则资纱,旱则资船,水则资车” - 范蠡
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#8
(09-06-2013, 12:40 PM)CityFarmer Wrote:
(09-06-2013, 12:06 PM)rogerwilco Wrote:
(09-06-2013, 11:32 AM)CityFarmer Wrote: IMO, real estate is unlikely a "mother" of all financial crisis.

What about the 2008 US subprime mortgage crisis ?

First of all, for argument sake, 2008 crisis is just one crisis among the three discussed, so it is non-conclusive to say "mother of all". Big Grin

Secondly, I will not relate the 2008 crisis with real estate, but with financial engineering and incentive model of bankers.

Hmm.. financial engineering helps to artifcially bring down financing property. Fueling housing bubble. . Is cheap financing that is the problem. . financial engineering is just a tool to get there. . As for incentive model of bankers.. another tool to sell the story to investors .the key here is cheap financing. .many has attribute causes of 2008 to various factors but I find cheap financing more digestable...

As for being the mother of all, that is my opinion la. ..Smile
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#9
(09-06-2013, 01:03 PM)finnfinn Wrote:
(09-06-2013, 12:40 PM)CityFarmer Wrote:
(09-06-2013, 12:06 PM)rogerwilco Wrote:
(09-06-2013, 11:32 AM)CityFarmer Wrote: IMO, real estate is unlikely a "mother" of all financial crisis.

What about the 2008 US subprime mortgage crisis ?

First of all, for argument sake, 2008 crisis is just one crisis among the three discussed, so it is non-conclusive to say "mother of all". Big Grin

Secondly, I will not relate the 2008 crisis with real estate, but with financial engineering and incentive model of bankers.

Hmm.. financial engineering helps to artifcially bring down financing property. Fueling housing bubble. . Is cheap financing that is the problem. . financial engineering is just a tool to get there. . As for incentive model of bankers.. another tool to sell the story to investors .the key here is cheap financing. .many has attribute causes of 2008 to various factors but I find cheap financing more digestable...

As for being the mother of all, that is my opinion la. ..Smile

The 2008 financial crisis is never due to cheap financing? Subprime mortgage isn't a cheap financing, but an inferior in quality and expansive financing. Maybe I miss-understood?

Probably you are referring to future crisis x year later, if any...
“夏则资皮,冬则资纱,旱则资船,水则资车” - 范蠡
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#10
BY courtesy of Wikipedia:-



Main article: Subprime mortgage crisis

The subprime mortgage crisis arose from 'bundling' American subprime and American regular mortgages which were traditionally isolated from, and sold in a separate market from prime loans. These 'bundles' of mixed (prime and subprime) mortgages were the basis asset-backed securities so the 'probable' rate of return looked superb (since subprime lenders pay higher premiums, and the loans were anyway secured against saleable real-estate, and so, theoretically 'could not fail'). Many mortgages had a low interest for the first year, and poorer buyers 'swapped' regularly at first, but finally such borrowers began to default in large numbers. The inflated house-price bubble burst, property valuations plummeted and the real rate of return on investment could not be estimated, and so confidence in these instruments collapsed, and all were considered to be almost worthless toxic assets, regardless of their actual composition or performance.

To avoid high initial mortgage payments, many subprime borrowers took out adjustable-rate mortgages (or ARMs) that give them a lower initial interest rate. But with potential annual adjustments of 2% or more per year, these loans can end up costing much more. So a $500,000 loan at a 4% interest rate for 30 years equates to a payment of about $2,400 a month. But the same loan at 10% for 27 years (after the adjustable period ends) equates to a payment of $4,220. A 6-percentage-point increase (from 4% to 10%) in the rate caused slightly more than a 75% increase in the payment.[8] This is even more apparent when the lifetime cost of the loan is considered (though most people will want to refinance their loans periodically). The total cost of the above loan at 4% is $864,000, while the higher rate of 10% would incur a lifetime cost of $1,367,280.

NB:
Finally a cleaner woman or a night club performer could have 3 or more properties at one go, at the peak of the subprime mortgage housing loan; with ZERO down payment or any collateral for all the properties. In fact synthetic subprime loans were created when institutions can not subprime loan fast enough.
i just wonder how can it be possible? Don't US has Monetary Regulators like most countries? Is it possible for our banks to do what what US banks had done? i like to borrow like them too but first make myself "penniless".
Nobody really can do what they did. i think the next change of crisis due to QE problems will most probably start from them too. Anyway, QE is started from them.
WB:-

1) Rule # 1, do not lose money.
2) Rule # 2, refer to # 1.
3) Not until you can manage your emotions, you can manage your money.

Truism of Investments.
A) Buying a security is buying RISK not Return
B) You can control RISK (to a certain level, hopefully only.) But definitely not the outcome of the Return.

NB:-
My signature is meant for psychoing myself. No offence to anyone. i am trying not to lose money unnecessary anymore.
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